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Reasonable Guy,
These few excerpts may
help dispel wasting
any more time on the Sixteenth Amendment being limited to “gain or
profit,” arguments. The SUPREME COURT clearly laid that issues to rest,
note: EVEN in the context of the Cheeks case ---“wages and salaries”. .
. set aside, @ Page 206 “We thus hold that, in a case like this, a
defendant’s views about the validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant
TO THE ISSUE OF WILLFULNESS, NEED NOT BE HEARD BY THE JURY, AND IF THEY
ARE, AN INSTRUCTION TO DISREGARD THEM WOULD BE PROPER . . .”
Cheek
ONLY over came the “willfulness charge”, because of A BAD JURY
INSTRUCTION FROM THE COURT “ . . . petitioner's asserted beliefs that
wages are not income . . .” Gave Cheeks his OUT because of his “Good
faith belief” which should have been PRESENTED TO THE JURY for their
determination as to an issues of FACT for the JURY TO DECIDE.
Notwithstanding:
Not one of Cheeks legal claims (including the letter from the
attorney), was EVER considered by the court as ANYTHING but objectively
off point and “frivolous.”
I’m afraid, Dale’s “plan”
of
educating the “masses” regarding “profits and gains, or any other
citing from the codes, will NOT be seen as creditable. I believe he
means well, but so did Irwin mean well — this type of solutions is no
solutions or wishful thinking at best.
I repeat: The Sixteenth
Amendment, the Code and ALL the rest of 35 years of these types of
arguments will not do.
So for what it’s worth,
good luck with your impasse with Dale.
Cheek v. United States
498 U.S. 192
[498
U.S. 196]………………..Cheek produced a letter from an attorney stating that
the Sixteenth Amendment did not authorize a tax on wages and salaries,
but only on gain or profit. Petitioner's defense was that, based on the
indoctrination he received from this group and from his own study, he
sincerely believed that the tax laws were being unconstitutionally
enforced and that his actions during the 1980-1986 period were lawful. “
[498
U.S. 206]………………….We thus hold that, in a case like this, a defendant's
views about the validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant to the
issue of willfulness, need not be heard by the jury, and if they are,
an instruction to disregard them would be proper. For this purpose, it
makes no difference whether the claims of invalidity are frivolous or
have substance. It was therefore not error in this case for the
District Judge to instruct the jury not to consider Cheek's claims that
the tax laws were unconstitutional.
However, it was error
for the court to instruct [498 U.S. 207] the jury that petitioner's
asserted beliefs that wages are not income and that he was not a
taxpayer within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code should not be
considered by the jury in determining whether Cheek had acted willfully.
Perspective
| 03.23.06 - 7:14 pm | #
Cheek V. U.S. 498 U.S. 192
Petitioner Cheek was
charged with six counts of willfully failing to file a federal income
tax return in violation of 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and
three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income taxes in
violation of 7201. Although admitting that he had not filed his
returns, he testified that he had not acted willfully because he
sincerely believed, based on his indoctrination by a group believing
that the federal tax system is unconstitutional and his own study, that
the
tax laws were being unconstitutionally enforced and that his
actions were lawful. In instructing the
jury, the court stated that an
honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense, and does not negate
willfulness, and that Cheek's beliefs
that wages are not income and
that he was not a taxpayer within the meaning of the Code were not
objectively reasonable. It
also instructed the jury that a person's
opinion that the tax laws violate his constitutional rights does not
constitute a good-faith misunderstanding of the law. Cheek was
convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. |
The above is a good summary of the case. I have highlighted the
point that applies to all Tax Honesty researchers; "the tax laws were
being unconstitutionally [illegally] enforced".
The next part I highlighted is where the court erred in stating
basically, 'The court will decide if your belief is unreasonable."
And the third part where the court makes the decision that a belief
regarding wages is not reasonable. As an aside, here's what many
of the Tax Honesty Researchers "believe" about "wages". Opens in new window.
Now, Even though Cheek was convicted, his case contains some important
points.
Held:
1. A good-faith misunderstanding of the
law or a
good-faith belief that one
is not violating the law negates willfulness, whether or not the
claimed belief or
misunderstanding is objectively
reasonable. Statutory
willfulness, which protects
the average citizen from prosecution
for innocent mistakes made due to the complexity of the tax laws,
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 , is the voluntary,
intentional violation of
a known legal duty. United
States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 .
Thus, if the jury credited Cheek's assertion that he truly believed
that the Code did not treat wages as income, the Government would not
have carried its burden to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a
court might deem such a belief. Characterizing
a belief as objectively unreasonable transforms what is normally a
factual inquiry into a legal one, thus preventing a jury from
considering it. And forbidding a jury to consider evidence that might
negate willfulness would raise a serious question under the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial provision, which this interpretation of the
statute avoids. Of course,
in deciding whether to credit Cheek's
claim, the jury is free to consider any admissible evidence showing
that he had knowledge of his legal duties. |
Held:
- A good faith belief that one is not violating the law
negates willfulness, whether or not the claimed belief is objectively
reasonable.
- Statutory willfulness is the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.
- Forbidding a jury to
consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a
serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision.
Item three above is of importance when coupled with the details within
the case itself.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of
the Court.
Title 26, 7201 of the
United
States Code provides that any person "who willfully attempts in any
manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment
thereof" shall be guilty of a felony. Under 26 U.S.C. 7203, "[a]ny
person required under this title . . . or by regulations made under
authority thereof to make a return . . . who willfully fails to . . .
make such return" shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. This case turns on
the meaning of the word "willfully" as used in 7201 and 7203. |
As does any case under 7201 or 7203
I
Petitioner John L.
Cheek has
been a pilot for American Airlines since 1973. He filed federal income
tax returns through 1979, but thereafter ceased to file returns.
...
Petitioner's income during this period at all times far
exceeded the minimum necessary to trigger the statutory filing
requirement. |
What is the definition of income
as used in this sentence? What is the definition of the word income used in the IRC? What
is the definition of income "in it's constitutional sense"?
| In the course of its
instructions, the trial court advised the jury that, to prove
"willfulness," the Government must prove the voluntary and intentional
violation of a known legal duty, a burden that could not be proved by
showing mistake, ignorance, or negligence. |
There is more to follow regarding this "known legal duty".
II
The general rule that
ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal
prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.
Based on the notion
that the
law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person
knew the law. This common law rule has been applied by the Court in
numerous cases construing criminal statutes.
The
proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it
difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of
the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has accordingly softened the
impact of the common law presumption by making specific intent to
violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses.
Thus, the Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the statutory term
"willfully" as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out
an exception to the traditional rule.
...
Taken together, Bishop
and
Pomponio conclusively establish that the standard for the statutory
willfulness requirement is the "voluntary, intentional violation of a known
legal duty." |
There is more to follow regarding this "known legal duty".
III
Cheek accepts the
Pomponio
definition of willfulness, but asserts that the District Court's
instructions and the Court of Appeals' opinion departed from that
definition. In particular, he challenges the
ruling that a good-faith
misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief
that one is not violating the law, if it is to negate willfulness, must be objectively
reasonable. We agree that
the Court of Appeals and the District Court erred in this respect.
|
Cheek challenges the trial court's ruling that a good-faith belief that
one is not violating the law must be objectively reasonable. The
Supreme Court agrees. So no matter how ridiculous a belief is, it
negates willfulness.
A
Willfulness, as
construed by
our prior decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the
Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty,
and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. |
The only way to prove that
the
law imposes a duty on a defendant is for the government to SHOW THE JURY the
statute that creates the duty. That has been something
NOTICABLY MISSING from the cases of Simkanin, Schiff, and Rose.
Never was proof shown to the jury that there was a duty created by a
statute. What proof does the jury have otherwise. If the
judge asserts "there is a duty", a judge could (and did) LIE to the
jury regarding the existence of a statutory or regulatory duty.
...
Of course, in deciding
whether to credit Cheek's good-faith belief claim, the jury would be
free to consider any admissible evidence from any source showing that
Cheek was aware of his duty to file a return and to treat wages
as income, including evidence
showing his awareness of the relevant provisions of the Code or
regulations, of court
decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law, of authoritative
rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, or of any contents of the personal
income tax return forms and accompanying instructions that made it
plain that wages should be returned as income. |
What a loaded compound sentence.
There are two points here that bear on the Cheek case itself:
- Duty to file a return;
- Duty to "treat wages as income".
Dealing with point 2 first, "A duty to treat
wages as income".
Regardless of what the courts say in regard to "wages are income",
right here, right now, is an admission by the court that wages are NOT
income. Wages do NOT fall under
the description of "income
in its constitutional sense". Income and wages are two
DIFFERENT items. The admission that wages are NOT income is
the "duty"
to "treat wages AS income".
Now dealing with point 1, proving that Cheek (or anyone else) has the
duty to file a return, this compound sentence says "the jury would be
free to consider any
admissible evidence ... including evidence showing his awareness of the
relevant provisions of the Code or regulations". If the
accused can cite chapter and verse of the relevant provisions of the
Code or regulations, such as Dick Simkanin, Irwin Schiff, or Larken
Rose could, Wouldn't you think that they would be the best witnesses to
prove their own "awareness of the
relevant provisions of the Code or regulations"?
Instead, judges are routinely gagging defendent's from proving that the
government did NOT in fact "prove that the law
imposed a duty on the defendant". Quite simply, proof that
a law does NOT impose a duty on a defendant is to simply observe the
law the government contends imposes the duty. (And in some cases a
string of law is required when laws are predicated upon other laws to
be activated.)
We thus disagree with
the
Court of Appeals' requirement that a claimed good-faith belief must be
objectively reasonable if it is to be considered as possibly negating
the Government's evidence purporting to show a defendant's awareness of
the legal duty at issue. Knowledge and belief are characteristically
questions for the factfinder, in this case the jury. Characterizing a
particular belief as not objectively reasonable transforms the inquiry
into a legal one, and would prevent the jury from considering it.
...
forbidding the jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness
would raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
provision. |
Yeah, like sanctioning Irwin schiff everytime he brought up the law in
the Corrupt judge dawson's Court.
| It
was
therefore error to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of Cheek's
understanding that, within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not a
person required to file a return or to pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable income,
as incredible as such misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law
might be. |
"Evidence"
of "understanding"....
Like the actual freaking
written words of
the statutes and regulations.....
The Corrupt judge dawson sanctioned Schiff everytime Schiff voiced "evidence of Schiff's
understanding".
B
Those cases [
Murdock-Pomponio] construed the willfulness requirement in the
criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to require proof of knowledge of the law.
This was because in "our complex tax system, uncertainty often arises
even among taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the law" and "`[i]t is not the purpose of the law to
penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made
despite the exercise of reasonable care. |
Yet that "frank difference of opinion"
and the reasons supporting it was not allowed before the jury.
There is much more I would
cover
in detail if I put together a web page just for the Cheek
decision. Since it is perspective's resistance is futile and
don't read the actual written words of law that I am addressing, I am
addressing Cheek simply because perspective did. As such, here is
a summary of points:
- A good faith belief that one is not violating the law
negates willfulness, whether or not the claimed belief is objectively
reasonable.
- Statutory willfulness is the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.
- Forbidding a jury to
consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a
serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision.
- When the word income
is used, what definition; what meaning, is meant.
- The government must
prove
the voluntary and intentional
violation of a known legal duty.
- Willfulness ... requires
the government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant.
- The only way the government can prove #6 is to show
the
jury the written words of law.
- Without #6, #5 can NOT happen.
- When a court does not allow the defendent to force
the
government to show the written words of law that the government claims
imposes a duty on the defendant (#6) the court has effectively forbidden the jury to consider evidence
that might negate willfulness.
- The government did NOT do #6 or
allow #7 in the Simkanin
trial, the Rose trial, or the Schiff trial.
I leave it to the reader to compare what I discern from this case and
what perspective discerns from this case.
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