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U.S. Federal Income Tax

Subjugation by taxation

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Cpt. Banjo v. Dale E.

Just because I said in the Week 1 Weekly Dale E that I wouldn't directly respond to my adversaries' replies, doesn't mean I won't take my adversaries' on for their lies in another thread.

Cpt. Banjo,
Sorry for not creating an arena for you to go toe to toe with me sooner.

Your page is up, and awaiting our appearance:
http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/cptbanjo.html

The topic you selected in another thread where I will not engage is the following:
"[T]here would seem to be no room to doubt that the word [income] must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act [of 1909], and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court." [Brackets are my addition for clarity.]
Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921)

If an entity is NOT "within the general description of 38, which comprises 'every corporation, joint stock company, or association organized for profit, and having a capital stock represented by shares", Can such an entity ever have "INCOME" according to this definition?

Clearly the answer is no.  If you are NOT a corporation within the definition of section 38 of the 1909 tax act, then your "proceeds of ores mined" is NOT "INCOME" according to the 1909 tax act.
Sigh...what Dale the Cretin still doesn't get is that the taxpayer in Smietanka was a trust, not a corporation -- especially not a corporation within the definition of section 38 of the 1909 tax act. Yet the Court held that the trust was taxable on the gain it realized on the sale of secirities.
Mr. Banjo,
I now call you on your lawyerly LIE.

[5] Please admit or deny that the following text is contained within the Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) Supreme Court decision. The default is admit.

    "Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.

    A writ of error brings this case here for review of a
    judgment of the District Court of the United States for the
    Northern District of Illinois, sustaining a demurrer to a
    declaration in assumpsit to recover an assessment of taxes
    for the year 1917, made under warrant of the Income Tax Act
    of Congress, approved September 8, 1916 (39 Stat. c. 463, p.
    756), as amended by the act approved October 3, 1917 (40
    Stat. c. 63, p. 300). Payment was made under protest, and the
    claim to recover is based upon the contention that the fund
    taxed was not 'income' within the scope of the Sixteenth
    Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that
    the effect given by the lower court to the act of Congress
    cited renders it unconstitutional and void."

[6] Please admit or deny that the following contention of the plaintiff is contained within the Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) Supreme Court decision. The default is admit.

    "... the contention that the fund taxed was not 'income'
    within the scope of the Sixteenth Amendment to the
    Constitution of the United States..."

[7] Please admit or deny that the contention highlighted in [6] above raises a question as to the meaning of "INCOME" as it is used in the 16th Amendment.  The default is admit.

[8] Please admit or deny that the following text is contained within the Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) Supreme Court decision. The default is admit.

    "The ground of the protest, and the argument for the plaintiff
    in error here, is that the sum charged as 'income'
    represented appreciation in the value of the capital assets
    of the estate which was not 'income' within the meaning of
    the Sixteenth Amendment, and therefore could not
    constitutionally be taxed, without apportionment, as required
    by section 2, clause 3, and by section 9, clause 4, of
    article 1 of the Constitution of the United States."

[9] Please admit or deny that the following contention of the plaintiff is contained within the Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) Supreme Court decision. The default is admit.

    "... the sum charged as 'income' ... was not 'income' within
    the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment,..."

[10] Please admit or deny that the contention highlighted in [9] above raises a question as to the meaning of "INCOME" as it is used in the 16th Amendment.  The default is admit.

[11] Please admit or deny that the following text is contained within the Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) Supreme Court decision. The default is admit.

    "There remains the question, strenuously argued, whether this
    gain in four years of over $700,000 on an investment of about
    $500,000 is 'income' within the meaning of the Sixteenth
    Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

[12] Please admit or deny that the question highlighted in [11] above raises a question as to the meaning of "INCOME" as it is used in the 16th Amendment.  The default is admit.

[13] Please admit or deny that the following text is contained within the Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) Supreme Court decision. The default is admit.

    The question is one of definition, and the answer to it may
    be found in recent decisions of this Court.

[14] Please admit or deny that in order to address: the contention shown in [6] above; the contention shown in [9] above; and; the question shown in [11], the court must address the definition of "INCOME" as it MUST be used in the 16th Amendment.  The default is admit.

[15] Please admit or deny that in order to address the definition of "INCOME" as it MUST be used in the 16th Amendment, the court MUST state what that definition is.  The default is admit.

[16] Please admit or deny that in order to learn what the definition of "INCOME" used in the 16th Amendment is, one needs to look at the Supreme Court cases that define what 16th Amendment "INCOME" is.  The default is admit.

[4] Please admit or deny that in order to for the court to hold "that the trust was taxable on the gain it realized on the sale of secirities", the court had to bring the exact meaning of 16th Amendment "INCOME" into view.  The default is admit.

BTW, I'm not done examining the definition of 16th Amendment "INCOME" in my Weekly Dale E postings, and thus have NOT yet addressed the additions to the 1909 tax act definition which IS the foundation for the Constitutional, 16th Amendment meaning.

[1] Thank you for calling me such names. Such actions are a mirror to who and what you are.

[2] Whether the entity in the Merchant's v. Smietanka case is a trust, corporation, or natural person has NO BEARING upon the Constitutional definition of "INCOME", of which learning what that definition is, is the purpose of examining that case, and others in that line of cases.

[3] You are correct that Merchant's trust is NOT a corporation defined under the 1909 tax act. The point is moot, because you have NOT refuted the point developed in Weekly Dale E #10 that "compensation for labor" is NOT "INCOME" as the term is defined for use in the 16th. Amendment.
[2] Whether the entity in the Merchant's v. Smietanka case is a trust, corporation, or natural person has NO BEARING upon the Constitutional definition of "INCOME", of which learning what that definition is, is the purpose of examining that case, and others in that line of cases.

[2] It has everything to do with your absurd attempt to restrict the meaning of "income" to corporate income.

[2]  You fail to address points [5] & [6] which support point [7].  You fail to address point [7]. I'm putting point [7] back in front of you.  You fail to address points [8] & [9] which support point [10].  I'm putting point [10] back in front of you.

[7] Please admit or deny that the contention highlighted in [6] above raises a question as to the meaning of "INCOME" as it is used in the 16th Amendment.  The default is admit.

[10] Please admit or deny that the contention highlighted in [9] above raises a question as to the meaning of "INCOME" as it is used in the 16th Amendment.  The default is admit.

Those points not shown in this post can be found up this thread in the news group, or on this page:
http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/cptbanjo.html


[3] You are correct that Merchant's trust is NOT a corporation defined under the 1909 tax act. The point is moot, because you have NOT refuted the point developed in Weekly Dale E #10 that "compensation for labor" is NOT "INCOME" as the term is defined for use in the 16th. Amendment.

[3] Of course I have, because your sole ground for that ridiculous point was that "income" is restricted to corporate income.

Admit or deny:  the following language is to be found in Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991):

"...it is incomprehensible to me how, in this day, more than 70 years after the institution of our present federal income tax system with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 166, any taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his defense to charges of statutory willfulness the proposition that the wage he receives for his labor is not income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and advises the gullible to resist income tax collections."

[3a] I admit the language shown above is found in Cheek.
[3a1] Admit or deny that the text shown above is "JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting."
[3a1] Admit or deny the following text is also found in Cheek:
"Characterizing a belief as objectively unreasonable transforms what is normally a factual inquiry into a legal one, thus preventing a jury from considering it. And forbidding a jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision..."

[3b1] "Of course I have" - Naked assertion.[3b2]   "your sole ground for that ridiculous point was that "income" is restricted to corporate income".  Your assumption does you, and the readers of this dialog, a great disservice.  Why are you so afraid to look at the words of the court where that "ridiculous point" is created?

[3c] Admit or deny the following text is fount in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921):
[3c][17]  "[T]here would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court."

[3c] [18] Admit or deny that the word income MUST be given the same meaning in ALL the tax acts of Congress. 

[3c][19] Admit or deny that the 1909 tax act definition is the foundation for the meaning of  Constitutional Income.


[3c] I Admit the words cited in regard to Cheek. Now it's your turn to admit citations from Cheek.

[3c][20] Admit or deny the following language is to be found in Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991):
"1. A good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law negates willfulness, whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.

Statutory willfulness, which protects the average citizen from prosecution for innocent mistakes made due to the complexity of the tax laws, United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 , is the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 .

Characterizing a belief as objectively unreasonable transforms what is normally a factual inquiry into a legal one, thus preventing a jury from considering it. And forbidding a jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision..."

[3c][20a] Admit or deny that "Statutory willfulness ... is the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."

[3c][21] Admit or deny the following language is to be found in Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991):
"Title 26, 7201 of the United States Code provides that any person "who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof" shall be guilty of a felony. Under 26 U.S.C. 7203, "[a]ny person required under this title . . . or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return . . . who willfully fails to . . . make such return" shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. [498 U.S. 192, 194]   This case turns on the meaning of the word "willfully" as used in 7201 and 7203."

[3c][21a] Admit or deny that the court is examining sections 7201 & 7203.
[3c][21b] Admit or deny that both statutes refer to "any PERSON".
[3c][21c] Admit or deny if one is not the PERSON to which the statute applies, then the penalties of 7201 & 7203 do not apply.

[3c][22] Admit or deny the following language is to be found in Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991):
"In the course of its instructions, the trial court advised the jury that, to prove "willfulness," the Government must prove the voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty, a burden that could not be proved by showing mistake, ignorance, or negligence. The court further advised the jury that an objectively reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of the law would negate willfulness, but mere disagreement with the law would not."

[3c][22a] Admit or deny that "Statutory willfulness ... is the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."

[3c][23] Admit or deny the following language is to be found in Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991):
"The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system. ... Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law. This common law rule has been applied by the Court in numerous cases construing criminal statutes."

[3c][23a] Admit or deny that there is a "notion that the law is definite and knowable".
[3c][23b] Admit or deny that any law that is not "definite and knowable" is "void for vagueness".

[3c][24] Admit or deny the following language is to be found in Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991):
"Taken together, Bishop and Pomponio conclusively establish that the standard for the statutory willfulness requirement is the "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.""

[3c][24a] Admit or deny that "Statutory willfulness ... is the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."

[3c][25] Admit or deny the following language is to be found in Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991):
"Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty."

[3c][26] Admit or deny that if there is no duty, there can NOT ever be a willful failure to do such non-existent duty.

Admit or deny that both the majority and the dissenting Justices in Cheek viewed Cheek's constitutional arguments as frivolous.

I'm not helping you erect a straw man. Now you go back to what I posted and focus on the issues I DID raise, not the ones I did NOT raise.

http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/cptbanjo.html


I'm simply addressing your inane argument that "income" under the 16th Amendment is limited to corporate income.  No one except total crackpots like you, Cheek, Schiff, Rose, and all the other cretins accept the absurd notion that their compensation isn't taxable.

You're simply addressing an "argument" that I have not made. 

First, a history lesson:  Admit or deny that the Supreme Court in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) stated the following words [except the words in brackets]:

"[T]here would seem to be no room to doubt that the word [income] must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act [of 1909], and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court."

[Brackets are my addition for clarity.]

http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/cptbanjo.html




























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